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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper assesses the effectiveness of self-regulation to promote investor interests. The 
Netherlands provides an excellent opportunity to gather such evidence for two reasons.  First, 
characteristics of the Dutch corporate governance structure have made it the recent focus of 
attention by the European Union, the International Monetary Fund and countries (e.g., Korea) 
when deliberating issues of corporate governance.  Second, during the period 1996-1998, a 
private sector initiative was undertaken to promote change in the balance of power between 
management and investors. Not surprisingly, the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission has closely followed the Dutch “experiment” in self-regulation.  We begin by 
identifying corporate governance characteristics that are linked to firm value. We then 
compare corporate governance characteristics and the relation between firm value and these 
characteristics before and after the private sector initiative. We find that the 
recommendations of the private sector initiative had no substantive effect on corporate 
governance characteristics or their relationship with firm value. Using event study techniques 
we document the market’s skepticism about the successful evolution of corporate governance 
practices in the Netherlands through self-regulation. The one exception to this general 
conclusion is the market for new listings. Overall, our results confirm the importance of 
shareholder voting rights, and who controls these rights, when considering the design of a 
successful self-regulation process.    
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1.  Introduction 
 
Increased international competition and the integration of Europe through the European 
Union have focused attention on industries and companies that are restructuring to meet 
competition and to promote economic growth.  Accompanying this restructuring is a demand 
for capital to finance such activities. With limits to conventional sources of capital (e.g., 
banks and governments), attention has shifted to capital markets.  In capital markets, 
corporate governance plays a crucial role in determining where, in what form, and at what 
cost capital is provided by outside investors (e.g., Price Waterhouse, 1997, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998, and Financial Times, 
20 June 2000).  
 
It is well known that agency problems are associated with the separation of ownership and 
control in corporations (Berle and Means, 1932, Jensen and Meckling, 1976, and Fama and 
Jensen, 1983a and 1983b).  To mitigate these problems, corporate governance mechanisms 
have evolved to help companies raise funds from debt and equity markets.   Corporate 
governance can be viewed as a mechanism design problem that is economic, legal, and 
politically based.  As such, it is of interest to determine when market forces are sufficient to 
promote change as well as when legal/political actions are required to write and enforce 
contracts between owners and managers of capital (Alchian, 1950, Stigler, 1958, and Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). 
 
This paper assesses the effectiveness of self-regulation to promote investor interests.  For two 
reasons, the Netherlands provides an excellent opportunity to address this issue.  The first 
reason is the existence of a private sector initiative in corporate governance.  In 1996, based 
on an agreement between the Association of Securities Issuing Companies and the 
Amsterdam Exchanges, a Committee on Corporate Governance was formed.  The committee 
was chaired by J. Peters (retired CEO of Aegon), and its members included representatives 
from the business community, Amsterdam Exchanges, security issuing companies, 
academics and a platform of investors (stockholder and pension representatives).  The charge 
of the Peters Committee was to initiate debate and change in the balance of power between a 
firm’s management and investors.  
 
In June 1997, the Peters Committee issued its recommendations, which were designed to 
increase the effectiveness of management, supervision and accountability to investors in 
Dutch corporations.  A key element of the report was its reliance on self-enforcement, 
through market forces, to implement and enforce its recommendations. One year after the 
effective date of the report, the Committee initiated and then completed a project to assess 
the impact of the report (Monitoring Corporate Governance in Nederland, 1998). 
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A second reason for focusing on the Netherlands is the intense international interest shown 
by investors and policymakers in this private sector initiative, along with characteristics of 
the Dutch corporate governance structure, itself.  The Dutch economy is internationally 
focused, heavily influenced by international competition, but not we ll known for strong 
investor rights.1 However, because of its perceived ability to balance alternative interests 
within the firm, the Dutch structure is considered by many as a prototype for the European 
Union (e.g., Financial Times, 27 July 2000).   Moreover, outside Europe, the International 
Monetary Fund has offered to fund a project for Indonesia that has the Dutch corporate 
governance model as part of its focus.   The Korean government has also used the Peters 
Committee report during deliberations on corporate governance.  Finally, the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission has closely followed the Dutch “experiment” in self-
regulation. This suggests that the success or failure of self-regulation to promote effective 
corporate governance changes that enhance firm value is an important issue to regulators.   
 
We evaluate the impact of the Peters Committee’s recommendations by analyzing the 
Tobin’s Q (a measure firm performance) of companies listed on the Amsterdam Exchanges 
over the five-year period prior to and three-year period after the release of the report.  The 
data we study includes information on organizational form, voting rights, board 
characteristics, outside block-holders and debt characteristics.  We also use event study 
techniques to assess investors’ reactions to the various events associated with changes in 
corporate governance practices in the Netherlands.   
 
When domestic firms in the Netherlands reach a certain size, they are legally required to 
organize as a structured regime.  This regime requires a supervisory board comprised of 
outsiders and this board takes numerous powers from shareholders.  For example, the 
supervisory board elects the members of the management board (i.e., management) as well as 
electing its own members.  Due to the greater separation of ownership from control, we 
hypothesize that the structured regime has a negative relation with firm value.  The results 
support this hypothesis, Tobin’s Q is reduced by 0.60 (from 1.89 to 1.29) under the legally 
required structured regime. The voluntarily retained structured regime, which is a 
management choice for multi-national firms with more than fifty-percent of their employees 
outside the Netherlands, also exhibits a reduction in Tobin’s Q of 0.23 (from 1.89 to 1.66). 
Other aspects of our results are as follows.  Contrary to a monitoring hypothesis, major 
outside and industrial shareholders negatively influence firm value in the Netherlands.  
Financial institutions also do not provide much in the way of  a monitoring role, although 
there is no evidence of collusion. We also find that takeover defenses have a significant 
negative effect on firm value. 
 
Giving the Peters Committee every advantage, our results suggest that the use of one 
takeover defense  dropped and the negative impact on firm performance due to the 
concentration of industrial shareholdings was reduced over the pre- and post-Peters report 
period. Overall, however, it is difficult to discern an impact from the Peters Committee. Our 
event study results suggest that the market is also pessimistic about the substantive evolution 
of corporate governance practices in the Netherlands.  Moreover, the market appears 
                                                               
1 When comparing stock exchange capitalization to annual GDP (gross domestic product), the Dutch economy 
ranks sixth among developed countries in 1996 (Committee on Corporate Governance, 1997). 
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skeptical of the underlying premise of the Peters Committee, that (in the Netherlands) market 
forces via self-regulation are sufficient to promote changes in corporate governance that lead 
to increases in firm value. An exception to this general conclusion is the disciplining role of 
the new listings market in the post-Peters period. Pos t-Peters new listings exhibit uniformly 
significant and favorable changes in their corporate governance when compared to new 
listings in the pre-Peters period.  
 
Our results for the Netherlands are a stark contrast to those from the United Kingdom’s more 
limited initiative on self-regulation, the Cadbury Committee.  Dedman, 2000, and Dahya, 
McConnell and Travlos, 2001, document significant changes in board structure and 
management characteristics following the Cadbury Committee’s recommendations as well as 
an increase in the average performance of the firms in the Dahya et. al. sample. Stiles and 
Taylor, 1993, further document that significant changes took place within one year of the 
Cadbury Committee’s report and recommendations. While the Cadbury Report is a 
“voluntary code,” it recommends a mandatory compliance report. In 1993, the London Stock 
Exchange adopted the recommendations and firms were required to provide reasons if they 
did not fully comply with the Cadbury recommendations.  Reviews by outside auditors were 
also required. In addition, there was the threat of litigation in the report if companies did not 
comply with the guidelines. 
 
For the Peters Committee, it was transparency and accountability via a system of self-
regulation that was expected to promote effective corporate governance.  It recommended 
only one monitoring report in which firms reported the status of their compliance with the 
recommendations.  While the Amsterdam Exchanges agreed to monitor the outcome, only 
159 of the 208 firms reported and nothing happened to those who failed to report.  The Peters 
report contained no legislation threats and the Minister of Finance made no public statements 
regarding non-compliance with the reporting requirement or the recommendations.   Further, 
the Amsterdam Exchanges took no enforcement position on the report’s recommendations, 
and the Dutch equivalent of the Securities and Exchange Commission exhibited no intention 
to change policy based on the report’s recommendations.    On balance, it’s not surprising 
that the Peter’s report had so little impact on corporate governance practices in the 
Netherlands.  
 
This naturally leads to the question, what is necessary for market forces to succeed in the 
Netherlands? One of the Peters Committee recommendations provides the starting point.  
Namely, an appeal to reevaluate the numerous constraints placed on the rights of 
shareholders. Voting limitations should be reevaluated to increase the day-to-day 
accountability of the management and supervisory boards. Evidence suggests that this is 
more efficient than relying on the market for corporate control to improve governance and 
performance (Franks and Mayer, 1996, and Gugler, 1999). However, when conventional 
monitoring fails, takeover defenses should also be reevaluated so that the market for 
corporate control is allowed to function.  Since supervisory and management boards 
effectively control an existing company’s voting rights (via the structured regime and 
takeover defenses), it is doubtful that market forces can succeed without legal/political action 
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to restore the voting rights of shareholders.2 The possible exception is the market for new 
listings with its relative absence of entrenched parties. 
 
The next section presents a brief description of the Dutch corporate structure while section 3 
presents our hypotheses pertaining to the relation between corporate governance 
characteristics and firm value.  Section 4 describes our data, section 5 reports our results and 
section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. The Dutch corporate structure  
 
2.1. Legal structure and stakeholder rights 
Current Dutch company law was enacted in 1971, after a government committee (Verdam 
Committee) issued a proposal for company law reform in 1965 and a draft law based on the 
report in 1968. 3   At the time , there was a perceived monitoring problem within large 
companies and a desire to increase management’s accountability to the company’s broader 
set of “stakeholders” (i.e., investors, employees and the general public).  The law addressed 
these two concerns by altering the legal form of large companies via the creation of the 
“Structured Regime" (see below).  It also broadened accountability to include the possibility 
of three boards, a supervisory board, a management board (technically named the board of 
directors) and a works council, each with defined responsibilities.  
 
As a starting point, we consider a shareholder-controlled firm with a supervisory board and a 
management board.  Shareholders elect members of the supervisory board and management 
board as  well as approve the annual accounts.  Dividend policy is set by management with 
the consent of the supervisory board and formally approved by shareholders.  Shareholders 
also vote on such issues as mergers and acquisitions.  All votes are taken at the annual 
General Meeting of Shareholders and physical presence is required (voting by proxy is not 
part of the Dutch structure). 
 
Once a company attains a certain size, it adopts the Full “Structured Regime” which is 
legally required for Dutch companies with more than 100 employees, a legally installed work 
council and book value of shareholders’ equity in excess of NLG 25 million (about US 
$12.5M).  Independent of the structured regime, the law requires a works council when a 
company has more than 100 employees. The full structured regime requires a supervisory 
board that takes over the following powers from shareholders: establishing (and by default 
the approval of) the annual accounts, the election of the management board, and the election 
                                                               
2 In general, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2000, are skeptical about substantive 
legal/political action because of the intense opposition based upon the self-interest of the parties involved and 
the lack of appreciation for the importance of investor rights. 
3 The Verdam Committee referred to the situation as “no longer acceptable”; inadequate control of 
management’s activities led to their propensity to misstate the firms’ financial position and to violate the 
position of shareholder, debtholders and employees (Verdam Committee, 1965, p. 119-125).  This was the 
major drive to restructure company law (Mertens, 1997).  Slagter, 1996, documents the desire for more co-
determination (medezeggenschap ); meaning that all stakeholders interests should be represented in a fair way.  
The law also dealt with financial reporting requirements, the right of inquiry, a works council and the 
establishment of the enterprise chamber at the Amsterdam court (Zeff et al, 1992, p.171 - 181).  
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of the supervisory board itself (called co-optation).  The supervisory board also has authority 
over major decisions made by the management board. 
 
There are exceptions to the legal requirements for the full structured regime.  The most 
prevalent exception is Dutch multinationals with more than 50% of their employees outside 
the Netherlands.  Such companies file and obtain an exemption from the full structured 
regime. However, a Dutch company may then voluntarily retain the full structured regime, 
and Dutch multinationals typically do, even though a company is not legally required to do 
so. 4  
 
Turning to the two boards and the works council, a Dutch company operates under a two-tier 
management structure consisting of a Supervisory Board and Management Board. The 
supervisory board is “independent” of the company and comprised entirely of “outsiders.” 
These outsiders primarily consist of “professional managers” and can (and often do) include 
past members of management. With the rare exception of a retired politician, politicians and 
regulators are not members of a supervisory board. Board members receive a fixed payment, 
depending on the firm’s size, for their services and very few hold shares in the company. 
Thus, reputation is important for getting and keeping such positions, which probably makes 
supervisory board members risk averse. The law requires that the board serve the firm’s 
interest.  However, under the structured regime, the supervisory board has very few 
restrictions on its ability to determine its own composition, re -appointments and other 
organizational matters including the management board. The law requires that the 
management board serve at the pleasure of the supervisory board.   
 
The management board consists of the company’s management team and may be as small as 
one member, the president.  The management board reports to the supervisory board and is 
responsible for attaining the company’s objectives, its strategy and policy, and the ensuing 
results.  Labor is not required to have an “outside” representative on the supervisory board 
nor is labor a member of the management board (Company Law of 1971).   The legally 
installed works council (noted above) has a right to relevant information and to advise on 
such major issues as transfers of ownership, plant closings and major investments. While this 
is more than a formality, the management board decides and can overrule the advice of the 
works council. The works council’s permission is only required for changes in social 
arrangements (e.g., pensions, working hours, wages, safety rules).  If the council disagrees 
with the company’s proposals on social arrangements, the company must obtain a local 
judge’s decision to proceed.  
 
2.2. Ownership and voting rights 
At the time of its organization, a company has an authorized capital structure consisting of  
“common” shares.  Once issued, the shares are registered with the company.  Such 
                                                               
4 Companies required to apply the structured regime have statutes detailing the exact rights and duties of the 
supervisory board.  If a company no longer meets these criteria (e.g., due to its international scope) and it wants 
to change to another organizational form, its statutes mu st be changed.  The management board, supervisory 
board or the annual shareholders meeting may suggest a change in the statutes. However, the supervisory board 
still has most of the legal powers and shareholders usually have a limited say in this.  This could be one of the 
reasons why a relatively large number of the largest publicly listed companies apply the structured regime on a 
voluntary basis. 
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“registered” (or ordinary) shares have voting, dividend and trading rights.  When the 
company’s organization and size require the full structured regime, the supervisory board is 
granted the rights (detailed above) previously held by shareholders.  Shareholders still vote 
on mergers and acquisitions and dividend policy under the structured regime.  
 
A company can also have a second type of security called “Certificates.” In fact, under the 
structured regime, the supervisory board can request the exchange of ordinary shares for 
certificates.5 A Trust Office administers the certificates when issued or initiates a 
certification process where certificates are exchanged for ordinary shares.  The trust office is 
comprised of members from the company (supervisory board and management board) and 
the “outside” (not from the company). While the chairman and majority of the trust office 
members must be outsiders, in practice, the trust office is always friendly to existing 
management.  The trust office is given responsibility for the ordinary shares associated with 
the certificates.  Through the process of certification, legal, but not “economic” ownership of 
the ordinary shares is transferred to the trust office (Slagter, 1996, p.210).  Certificate holders 
have dividend rights, can freely trade their certificates and can attend the General Meeting of 
Shareholders, but they cannot vote.  The trust office holds all voting rights including 
approval of the dividend policy.6   Individual shareholders do not have a formal obligation to 
exchange their ordinary shares when a company decides to issue certificates. However, the 
company may decide to de-list its ordinary shares from the exchange, leaving a shareholder 
with the choice of non-listed bearer shares or listed certificates (the latter being much easier 
to trade).   The prevailing type of Certificate is the limited exchangeable certificate.  Once 
issued, these certificates can be exchanged for ordinary shares up to a maximum percentage 
of 1% of outstanding equity capital. However, once exchanged for ordinary shares, holders 
loose trading privileges for the exchanged shares. Ordinary shares can be reconverted to 
certificates, but then voting rights are lost.  
 
As takeover defenses, companies may have additional types of securities in their capital 
structure.  The most common takeover defense is “protective preference shares.”  
Management can issue such shares to a friendly trust office or outside investor during a 
hostile takeover threat.  Preference shares are sold at nominal value to the trust office or 
friendly investor with an obligation to pay only 25% of the amount up front.  Preference 
shares have voting rights and are restricted to a maximum of 50% or 100% of the current 
outstanding nominal capital depending on the anti-takeover amendments in place.  Special 
voting privileges are also granted through “Priority shares” which give their holders special 
rights in situations such as merger approval, new public offerings, charter amendments and 
company liquidation.  
 
If a company wants its shares or certificates traded on the Amsterdam Exchanges, there are 
requirements to be met.  The three most relevant for our study are minimum size, 
profitability and constraints on takeover defenses (Amsterdam Exchanges, 1997).   For 
                                                               
5 The supervisory board’s authority has limits even under the structured regime.  For example, if an individual 
owns 66% of the certificates (which translates into 66% of the votes), the individual can force the board to 
convert certificates to ordinary shares.  
6 Under all organizational forms, dividend policy is set by management with the consent of the supervisory 
board. 
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listing, the company’s book value of shareholders’ equity must be greater than NLG 11 
million (about US $5M) and it must have been profitable in three of the five years prior to 
listing.  Finally, the company can have only two of the three takeover defenses noted above 
(certificates, priority shares and protective preference shares).7   
 
 
3. Corporate governance characteristics and firm value  
 
Our main focus is organizational form and voting rights characteristics.  The hypothesized 
relations with firm value are detailed below.  To isolate the impact of these variables we must 
also recognize the monitoring role of major outside shareholders, the debt market and the 
effects of cross-listing on United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) exchanges. These 
hypothesized relationships are also detailed below.  Data from the 1992-1999 period 
(covering both the pre and post-Peters Committee period) are used to examine these 
relationships.  
 
3.1 Organizational form and voting rights 
Firm value is adversely affected by constraints placed on shareholders’ voting rights either 
permanently or by management’s attempt to mitigate the market for corporate control (e.g., 
Stulz, 1988, Malatesta and Walking, 1988).  In our context, the legally required structured 
regime is used to directly limit shareholder influence. Similarly, the voluntarily retained 
structured regime directly limits shareholder rights. However, the voluntarily retained 
structured regime is essentially a supervisory and management board choice. Other explicit 
constraints on shareholder influence occur through the use of certificates, and preference and 
priority shares, which as takeover defenses mitigate the market for corporate control. 
 
Major outside shareholders are hypothesized to constrain management’s (and under the 
structured regime, the supervisory board’s) deviation from value-maximizing behavior (e.g., 
Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, Cho, 1998, Holderness and Sheehan, 1988, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer, 1999, and Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988).  In our tests, we consider 
the influence of a major outside shareholder owning more than 5% of the shares.  We also 
investigate the influence of major shareholdings by financial institutions (i.e., banks, 
insurance companies, pension funds and institutional venture capitalists) and by industrial 
firms.  Financial institutions can have a positive or negative impact on firm value (Pound, 
1988).  The effect will be positive if they are more efficient monitors than atomistic 
shareholders. It will be negative if they collude with management.  While McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) find a positive relationship in the U.S., in the Netherlands financial 
institutions are known for their passive attitude. 8  With regard to industrial firm holdings, the 
                                                               
7 From 1982 to 1994, there was a second tier market (the official parallel market: “De Officiële Parallelmarkt”) 
for firms with at least NLG 5 million of book value of equity. Beginning in 1997, a second tier market was 
again initiated  (the new market: “Euro.NM”) for firms with a minimum of Euros 1.5 million of book value of 
equity but without a three out five year track record of profitability. We include firms listed on these markets in 
our sample.  
8 Cantrijn and Vente, 1997, sent questionnaires to Dutch institutional investors.  The responses showed that the 
investors perceive liquidity to be more important than control.  Exercising supervision on the firm’s investment 
policies and the remuneration are considered to be tasks of the institutions by only 20% and 33% of the 
respondents, respectively. 
 8 
effect may be positive due to improved monitoring or negative due to collusion and/or 
attempts to influence decisions for the benefit of their own company. 
 
Two final factors related to monitoring and firm value are debt markets and cross-exchange 
listing.  Debt markets can discipline management's deviation from value -maximizing 
behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Our tests use leverage and representation on the 
supervisory board by financial firms (i.e., interlocking directorates) as measures of this 
influence.  We also consider separate variables for bank debt and interlocking directorates 
with banks because we expect the role of leverage to be more pronounced for this latter type 
of debt.  
 
When companies are listed on exchanges outside the Netherlands, it is important to recognize 
the disciplining aspects this can have.  For example, UK and US stock exchanges require 
more company and compensation disclosure than the Amsterdam Exchanges. Our tests 
investigate a hypothesized positive impact of cross-listing on UK and/or US stock exchanges 
on the value of Dutch firms (Lins, Strickland and Zenner, 1999). 
 
Our empirical tests study the impact of the above factors on Tobin’s Q.  Tobin's Q is our 
measure of firm value and performance (Lindenberg and Ross, 1981) and it is measured as 
the market value of the firm divided by the replacement cost of its assets.   
 
3.2 The Peters Committee 
The Peters Committee issued its preliminary conclusions in October 1996 and its final 
recommendations (expected to be the same) in June 1997.  The committee’s report made a 
major appeal to re-evaluate the numerous constraints placed on the rights of shareholders.  
The committee spoke specifically to the accountability of the supervisory board (and 
management board) under the structured regime.  However, they did not address the inherent 
problems of the structured regime.  Rather, the committee addressed how to make the 
structured regime relatively more accountable to shareholders without changing the 
fundamental rights of shareholders.  Clearly, this is likely to be a difficult task, given 
shareholders have very few rights under the full structured regime.  
 
The committee’s monitoring report of December 1998 contained all of the corporate 
governance information that was collected on the companies for 1997 by the committee (one -
year after the release of the committee’s formal report).  We collected an additional two years 
of data. Using three years of data from the post-Peters period (i.e., 1997-1999), we conduct 
tests to assess the impact of the committee’s recommendations on the corporate governance 
variables outlined above and their relationship with Tobin’s Q.  We use the results from the 
pre-Peters period as a benchmark. As a means to further assess the impact of the Peters 
Committee’s recommendations, we also compare the governance characteristics of new 
listings during the pre-Peters period to those during the post-Peters period to see if any 
improvements in shareholder rights are observed. 
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4.  Sample, variable definitions, and empirical tests 
 
4.1. Sample 
Our sample contains all non-financial firms listed on the Amsterdam Exchanges from 1992-
1999.  We exclude financial firms because of their distinct regulatory structure. Our starting 
point is the yearly overviews of all securities listed at the Amsterdam Exchanges (Gids bij de 
Officiële Prijscourant van de Amsterdamse Effectenbeurs). There are 208 firms with a listing 
for at least one calendar year in the 1992-1999 period. Three firms are excluded because their 
annual reports are not available or the firm had incomparable year -ends. For the remaining 
205 firms, we collect data beginning in 1992 or the year following the year of the firm’s 
listing. We collect data through 1999 or the full calendar year preceding the last year of the 
firm’s listing. The data set consists of 205 firms with 1169 firm-year observations; the 
number of observations per year for the 1992-1999 period is 145, 143, 141, 138, 145, 146, 
152, and 159, respectively. 
 
Since our focus is the Peters Committee and its implications, we next exclude 26 firms (73 
firm-year observations) that were only listed during the pre-Peters period (1992-1996) and 39 
firms (61 firm-year observations) that were only listed during the post-Peters period (1997-
1999). Our primary sample consists of 140 firms with 1035 firm-year observations that are 
listed in both the pre and post-Peters period. 
 
Financial data, including bank de bt and board compensation, are obtained from a data set of 
Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek) and the Review and Analysis of 
Companies in Holland (REACH) dataset. We use the firms’ annual reports to identify the 
board members and to complete annual report information missing from Statistics 
Netherlands and REACH. Ownership structure is obtained from the leading Dutch financial 
daily newspaper (Het Financieele Dagblad) that annually publishes a list of exchange-listed 
firms and their stakeholders, according to the notifications for The Law on Disclosure of 
Shareholdings (Wet Melding Zeggenschap). Takeover defenses and cross-listings are from 
the yearly overviews of all securities listed at the Amsterdam Exchanges (Gids bij de 
Officiële Prijscourant van de Amsterdamse Effectenbeurs).  Data on structured regimes is 
obtained from the Monitoring Corporate Governance in Nederland (1998) and Honee, 
Timmerman and Nethe (2000) that provide structured regime classifications for 1997 and 
1999, respectively. We use the firm’s annual report for 1992 to classify the firms. The annual 
reports allowed us to investigate whether the supervisory board established (vaststellen) the 
annual accounts and whether the firms met the criteria for the structured regime. If we found 
a difference between 1992, 1997 or 1999, we investigated all annual reports over 1992-1999. 
In cases of inconsistency, we contacted the firm.   
 
4.2. Variable definitions and summary statistics 
Table 1a lists the variables used in our empirical tests along with the abbreviations used to 
refer to them in the tables and the text.  The table also contains simple descriptive statistics.  
Table 1b presents descriptive statistics for three sub-samples of interest, no structured 
regime, legally required structured regime and voluntarily retained structured regime.  
 
[Insert Table 1a and 1b Here] 
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The dependent variable, Tobin’s Q (TQ), is measured as the book value of liabilities plus the 
market value of equity divided by the replacement cost of the firm’s assets (see Perfect and 
Wiles, 1994).9 
Appearing next in Table 1a are control variables.  These variables are firm size measured as 
the book value of total assets (BVTA), growth measured as the log of one plus (Growth) the 
three-year historical growth rate of the firm’s book value of assets, and leverage (LEV) 
measured as long-term debt divided by book value of assets. Based on prior research, we 
expect the coefficient on BVTA to be negative and those on GROWTH and LEV to be 
positive.10  
Our first independent variable deals with cross-listing.  This variable, XLIST, takes on the 
value 1 (0) if the firm is (not) listed on an exchange in the UK and/or US.  The organizational 
form of the sample firms is addressed by the next two variables.  SR takes on a value of 1 (0) 
if the firm is (not) a legally required structured regime while SR_V takes on a value of 1 (0) 
if the firm has (not) voluntarily retained the structured regime.   
We capture limitations on shareholder rights by using PRIO which takes on a value of 1 (0) 
in the presence (absence) of priority shares, PREF which is set to 1 (0) if the company can 
(not) issue and place protective preference shares, and CERT which is set to 1 (0) when the 
company has (not) issued certificates.  
The role of the debt market as a disciplining force first focuses on financial institutions 
(banks, insurance companies, pension funds and institutional venture capitalists). In 
particular, we consider LEV (leverage) and FIN_ILOCK, which is the number of 
interlocking directorates with financial institutions. We next focus on banks by using 
BANK_D measured as firm’s bank debt (long-term bank debt divided by total assets) and 
BANK_ILOCK, which is the number of bank interlocking directorates on the supervisory 
board. Both measures of interlocking directorates reflect the number of relationships 
(interlocks) with banks or financial institutions, with bank interlocks being a subset of 
financial institutional interlocks.  Due to data availability we do not have a complete set of 
BANK_D observations. 
The five final independent variables capture the concentration and identity of outside 
shareholders as well as controlling for insider holdings.  OSIDE_EQ is the stake of the 
                                                               
9 In the Netherlands, firms either present replacement values or historical costs in their annual reports.  If 
replacement values are presented no adjustment is required.  If historical costs are presented, we have to adjust 
the value to estimate replacement value.  To do this, we assume that in the base year the replacement value 
equals the historical cost.  For each subsequent year, we adjust this replacement value by adding new invest-
ments and corrections for the growth in capital good prices and subtracting depreciation.  Growth in capital 
good prices is based upon the price index of investment goods, as provided by the Statistics Netherlands.  The 
replacement value of the assets is the book value of assets adjusted for these replacement value changes. 
10 A positive coefficient for leverage confirms the disciplinary role of leverage, as found in McConnell and 
Servaes, 1990. De Jong and Veld, 2001, documented the absence of this role of leverage in the Netherlands due 
to managerial entrenchment. This result is consistent with the “debt avoidance” hypothesis articulated by 
Zwiebel, 1996. 
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largest outside block-holder owning 5% or more of the shares,11 INSTI_EQ is the sum of all 
institutional block-holdings (banks, insurance companies, pension funds and institutional 
venture capitalists) and BANK_EQ is the sum of all bank block-holdings. INDUS_EQ is the 
sum of the block-holdings by industrial firms. To isolate the influence of outside 
shareholders, we must control for the sum of the block-holdings by insiders, supervisory and 
management board members (INSIDE_EQ).   
 
4.3. Regression model  
The following regression model is used to test the relationships developed above: 
TobinQ  = f (Organizational Form, Limits on Voting Rights, Debt Market, Outside 
Block-holders, and Control Variables). 
The specific variables designed to capture Organizational Form, Limits on Voting Rights, 
Debt Market, and Outside Block-holders were discussed above. All regression t-statistics are 
based on White’s heteroskedastic corrected standard errors.  Estimation of the above model is 
based on OLS and we incorporate fixed-effects for each year and for each firm. 12   
 
 
5. Results 
 
Our results are organized as follows.  We estimate regressions to test the relationships 
hypothesized in section 3.  Next, we isolate the impact the Peters Committee 
recommendations had on the corporate governance variables and the relation between these 
variables and Tobin’s Q (section 5.2).  Lastly, using event study techniques, we evaluate the 
impact of various corporate governance-related events and announcements related to the 
Peters Committee, Dutch government and European Union during the 1996-1999 period 
(section 5.3). 
 
5.1. Regression results for the 1992-1999 period (pre and post-Peters Committee) 
Our initial regression results are based on the 1992-1999 period. The regressions we estimate 
are variations of the model described above and the results are repor ted in Tables 2 and 3. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
Referring to model 1, consistent with prior research the coefficient on firm size is negative 
while that on growth is positive. The coefficient on the remaining control variable, leverage, 
                                                               
11 Because the Dutch Law on Disclosure of Shareholdings requires the notification of shareholdings when 
thresholds of 5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, or 66,7% are passed, we do not have information for shareholdings below 
5%. The percentage of firm-year observations with insider block-holdings in our data set is 16.7 %. This is not a 
high percentage, but some block-holdings are over 80% and thus significantly influence the average. 
12 An obvious aspect of panel data, like we use in this study, is that over time there are likely to be unobserved 
factors affecting the behavior of the dependent variable that cannot be identified or measured and included in 
the model. A common approach to control for such factors is to incorporate firm-specific intercepts into the 
regression model. The resulting fixed-effects regression assumes that the impact of the unobserved factors is 
constant through time for a given firm but different across firms.  An analogous argument is used to motivate 
the year-specific intercepts.  
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is insignificant.13 The disciplining aspects of increased disclosure and the resulting increased 
scrutiny is confirmed by the positive and significant coefficient on the cross-listing (UK 
and/or US) variable.   
Models (2) and (3) in Table 2 address the impact of organizational form on Tobin’s Q. 
Consistent with our most important hypothesis, the legally required structured regime has a 
significant negative impact on Tobin’s Q.  After controlling for the other shareholder rights 
variables (see model 3), the structured regime reduces Tobin’s Q by 0.555.  Similar results 
are found for firms that voluntary retain the structured regime, where Tobin’s Q is reduced 
by 0.639. It is important to view the effect of the required structure regime as distinct from 
the voluntarily retained structure regime because the former is not a managerial choice while 
that latter is.  
The impact of takeover defenses on Tobin's Q is also addressed in model (3).  Consistent 
with our predictions, the coefficients for priority shares, preference shares and certificates are 
negative and significant.  As described in section 3, certificates have a direct affect on 
shareholder rights, while preference shares represent potential protection against a takeover.  
Priority shares deal with specific circumstances that constrain shareholder rights.  
The regressions reported in Table 3 analyze ownership structure and relations with financial 
institutions.  In model (1), we focus on the monitoring role of the major block-holders.  The 
coefficients for the major outside shareholder, industrial block-holders and financial 
institutions are negative and significant. A large outside or industrial block-holder can force 
management to undertake activities that benefit the block-holder at the expense of other 
shareholders. For example, an industrial firm may act to reduce the competition between the 
companies or influence the prices at which transactions occur between the companies. The 
financial institutional result is consistent with both the collusion story of Pound (1988) and 
the passive attitude of Dutch financial institutions. (Later in this section, we provide 
additional evidence on the collusion interpretation). Finally, as expected, the coefficient on 
insider holdings is positive and significant. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
Model (2) in Table 3 focuses on financial institutions. Relative to model (1), we include the 
same ownership variables and also add interlocking directorates with financial institutions. 
The financial institutions that drive institutional holdings and interlocking directorates are 
essentially banks, insurance companies, pension funds and large venture capitalists. The 
coefficient for interlocking directorates is negative and significant, which reinforces the 
effect we previously documented for financial institutions on firm value.  
Banks are important financial institutions in the Netherlands. Similar to other institutions, 
banks are block-holders and have interlocking directorates with firms. In addition, banks 
provide debt to firms. We investigate the influence of banks by including block-holdings by 
                                                               
13 The insignificant result differs from the McConnell and Servaes, 1990, result that documents a positive 
influence. Our result is explained by de Jong and Veld, 2001, who found for a sample of debt and equity issues 
that Dutch firms avoid leverage when its disciplinary role in most valuable. Our insignificant effect is consistent 
with the absence of leverage as a disciplinary factor.  
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banks, interlocks with banks and long-term bank debt divided by total debt. 14 For this 
analysis we have 709 observations (due to missing observations for bank debt or firms with 
zero debt). The fixed-effect regression results (not tabled) show a negative coefficient for 
bank debt, –0.191, significant at the 5% level. Due to the reduced number of observations, 
the other variables become insignificant. Without the firm fixed-effects (results not tabled), 
the coefficient for bank debt remains significantly negative (at 1% level). Bank block-
holdings are significantly negative at the 5% level and interlocks are negative at the 1% level.  
The disciplinary role of bank debt is absent, which is consistent with the previously cited 
management entrenchment argument of de Jong and Veld, 2001, and Zwiebel, 1996.  
We next address the relationship between ownership structure and takeover defenses.  We 
know that ownership concentration may be a takeover defense as well as provide monitoring.  
Furthermore, the block-holdings of the largest outside equity-holder and the takeover 
defenses used (defined as the number of takeover defenses from certificates, priority and 
preference shares) are negatively correlated (-0.254). However, when we interact these two 
measures (regressions not tabled), the coefficient is insignificant. The coefficient for the 
takeover defenses used is negative and significant, as expected, since individually all three 
takeover defenses were already negative. Thus, no new information is obtained from viewing 
ownership concentration as a takeover defense. 
 
We investigated whether institutional investors “collude” with entrenched management and 
supervisory board members by focusing on an important situation where this could occur, 
takeovers.  Preference shares are frequently placed with friendly institutional investors during 
takeover attempts.   Therefore, we expect that ownership by institutional investors is more 
likely to induce entrenchment in firms that can issue preference shares.  Specifically, we 
consider preference shares and its interaction with institutional holdings.  While the 
coefficient for the interaction term is significant and positive, it is very small. It is too small 
to compensate for the significant and negative effects of preference shares and institutional 
holdings. Thus, there is no indirect evidence of collusion between the boards and institutions 
in potential takeover situations. 
 
5.1.1. Summary  
Our major result addresses the structured regime.  For domestic Dutch firms, the legally 
required structured regime has a negative impact on Tobin’s Q.  A similar finding exists for 
firms that voluntarily retained the structured regime. However, the voluntarily retained 
structured regime is a management choice because firms are allowed to change 
organizational form if fifty percent or more of their employees are outside the country. 
Increases in Tobin’s Q due to international competition and/or increased disclosure are also 
apparent when firms cross-list their securities with UK and/or US stock exchanges. Major 
outside and industrial shareholders negatively influence firm value, which is inconsistent 
with their monitoring role.  Financial institutions also fail in their monitoring role, although 
there is no indirect evidence of collusion. Finally, takeover defenses have a negative effect on 
firm value and this effect is significant. 
                                                               
14 We remove INSTI_EQ and FIN_ILK, because these variables are by definition highly correlated with bank 
equity and bank interlocks, respectively. 
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Given the importance of the supervisory board and its influence over the management board 
under the structured regime, and operations of the firm in general, a logical question to ask is 
whether our results are affected by the omission of supervisory board and management board 
characteristics.  For the supervisory board, we collected data on its absolute size, its size 
relative to the management board, its shareholdings (previously included in selected 
regressions as part of insider block-holdings), compensation of its members, and the 
interlocking directorates the firm’s board members have with other firms.  We collected 
analogous data for the management board.  Including these variables in the regressions with 
specific year-effects does not alter the basic tenets of our results (due to missing 
compensation observations, we cannot implement the firm fixed-effects regression).15  
As an alternative to a fixed-effects model, we also estimated regressions where firm-specific 
averages (eight years of data) were used to measure the dependent and independent variables. 
While the significance of the coefficients was altered due to the reduction in sample size, the 
signs of the coefficients are unchanged.  We also ran the regressions on a year-by-year basis, 
none of the significant coefficients changed signs when compared to the tabled regressions. 
5.2. Univariate and regression results for 1997-1999 period (post-Peters Committee) 
5.2.1. Univariate tests 
To gain an overall perspective on the impact of the Peters Committee, we first compare 
corporate governance characteristics, pre and post-Peters Committee.  It could be that 
entrenched management has the capability to forestall changes in a firm’s corporate 
governance.  One way to investigate this is to perform the same comparison as before but 
focus on firms that were listed for the entire sample period, 1992-1999.  It could also be the 
case that change manifests itself not through existing firms but through the market for new 
listings. For new listings, we compare governance characteristics pre and post-Peters. 
Finally, to insure that our results are not sensitive to the characteristics of the firms that were 
de-listed, we compare governance characteristics of the de -listed firms pre and post-Peters. 
For the firm characteristics and sample detailed in Table 1 (and supervisory and management 
board characteristics), we compared their values in 1992-1996 to those in 1997-1999 using 
univariate t-tests. The results show significant increases for Tobin’s Q, book value of assets, 
growth, cross-listings on US/UK exchanges and voluntarily retained structure regimes. 
Significant decreases were noted in the holdings of the largest outside block-holder and the 
use of priority shares. 16  We also compared firm characteristics in 1996 to those in 1997 
(results not tabled). The only significant change was growth, which increased.  The results 
for the 104 firms that were listed for the entire period, 1992-1999, are similar.  There is a 
significant increase in Tobin’s Q, growth and voluntarily retained structured regimes while 
there is a significant decrease in the use of priority shares.  
[Insert Table 4] 
                                                               
15  The results are also robust to alternative specifications of the dependent variable. The correlation between 
Tobin’s Q and the ratio of market to the book value of total assets is 0.998. The correlation between Tobin’s Q 
and the ratio of market to the book value of equity is 0.545. 
16 For supervisory and management board comparisons, the only significant change are board compensation, 
which is not inflation corrected and increased.  
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We also compared new listings in the pre-Peters period (21 firms) to those in the post-Peters 
period (39 firms).  Though the sample size is small, there are substantive differences in the 
characteristics of these firms.  The post-Peters new listings have a significantly lower number 
of takeover defenses and interlocking directorates with financial institutions and banks, lower 
equity holdings by financial institutions and banks, a lower proportion of voluntarily retained 
structured regimes (though no difference in the legally required structure regime), more 
insider equity holdings, and lower holdings by the largest outside block-holder. On balance, 
the new listings market appears to be a disciplinary force in the post-Peters period.  
Finally, we compared the 26 firms that were de-listed in the pre-Peters period to the 20 firms 
that were de-listed in the post-Peters period.  There were no significant differences in 
corporate governance characteristics between the two sets of firms.   
5.2.2. Regression analysis 
In Table 5, we perform two regressions, one for the 1992-1999 period (both the pre and post-
Peters periods) and one comparing the pre- and post-Peters periods. In the first regression, we 
include all significant variables from Tables 2 and 3. These variables encompass the 
variables that changed significantly from the pre to the post-Peters period.  The results are the 
same as those in Tables 2 and 3.  
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
To test for changes between 1992-1996 and 1997-1999, in the second regression we interact 
the governance variables with a dummy variable that has a value of 1 in 1997-1999, and 0 
otherwise. The left-hand column of the regression in Table 5 contains the coefficients for the 
1992-1996 period while the right-hand column contains the coefficients for the variables 
interacted with the 1997-1999 dummy variable. The results in the right-hand column 
document that the coefficient for the required structure regime is significantly negative, 
which implies that the already negative impact of this variable on firm value became more 
pronounced in the 1997-1999 period.  The coefficients for certificates, the major outside 
block-holder and interlocking directorates with financial institutions become negative and 
significant in the post -Peters period. The coefficient for industrial holdings is significantly 
positive, which implies that while the overall influence of industrial holdings is still negative, 
its influence was reduced in the post-Peters period.  
Giving the Peters Committee every advantage, our results sugges t that the use of priority 
shares (per the univariate analysis) dropped and the adverse effects of industrial holdings (per 
the regressions) was reduced for firms that spanned the pre and post -Peters periods. The 
disciplining role of the new listings market changes for the better in the post-Peters period.  
 
5.3  Stock price reactions to corporate governance events  
 
5.3.1. Background 
As the above univariate analysis and regressions using Tobin's Q illustrate, it is difficult to 
identify, at least in the short-run, an impact from the recommendations contained in the 
Peters Committee report.  However, the Committee did not operate in isolation, as there were 
additional Dutch government and European Union events with the potential to influence a 
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firm’s corporate governance structure and hence its value. In this section, we use "event 
study" techniques to assess investors’ reactions to the various events associated with the 
evolution of corporate governance practices in the Netherlands. In a sense, the event study  
analysis provides a direct market test of the premise underlying the Peters Committee, 
namely that for firms already listed on the exchanges, market forces via self-regulation are 
sufficient to promote changes in corporate governance that enhance shareholder value.  
  
Appendix A lists eleven events associated with corporate governance at the Committee, 
Dutch government and European Union level.  Our data sources are the Dutch equivalent of 
the Financial Times (Het Financieele Dagblad), the preliminary and final version of the first 
report of the Peters Committee and the monitoring report of the Committee.  
 
5.3.2. Event study analysis 
The "event study" method we use is an application of Zellner’s (1962) Seemingly-Unrelated-
Regression (SUR) methodology (see Schipper and Thompson 1983 and 1985 for a detailed 
discussion).  The returns -generating process of each firm is:  
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where Rit  is the return to security i on day t, Rmt is the return to the market index on day t, 
Dikt  is a dummy variable that takes  on a value of one on the day before and day of the 
announcement of event k (k=1, 2, ..., 11) and zero on all other days, ai is the model intercept 
of firm i, bi  is the slope coefficient or systematic risk of firm i,  gik is the abnormal return of 
firm i associated with event k, and e it is a random disturbance. For each firm the disturbances 
are assumed independent and identically distributed over time, but may be heteroscedastic 
and correlated in cross-section.  The firm-specific parameters of the model are estimated 
using daily stock return data from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 1999 (1,045 trading 
days).  The market index used is a value-weighted index of all firms traded on the 
Amsterdam Exchange  (results using alternative market indices yield similar results). The 
availability of daily stock price data for the January 1, 1996 to December 31, 1999 period 
reduces our sample to 114 firms for this analysis. 
 
The test of interest is the significance of the mean abnormal return of the sample firms at the 
time of each event.  In particular,  
)=(k    0, =   :H ik
N
=1i
0 11,...,2,1gå , 
where k denotes events and N denotes the number of firms.  Since the sum is a scalar 
multiple of the cross-sectional average, this test is equivalent to a test on the cross-sectional 
average abnormal return.  In addition to using this hypothesis to assess the sample-wide price 
reaction to each event, we also use it to assess the abnormal returns for particular sub-
samples of firms (e.g., the mean abnormal return of firms with the legally required structured 
regime). The significance of the sample (and sub-sample) mean abnormal return to each 
event is assessed using the F-test outlined in Schipper and Thompson, 1985. 
 
5.3.3. Event study results   
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Of the eleven events listed in Appendix A, only event 8 (the release of the Peters Committee 
monitoring report and the related corporate governance information it contained about the 
companies) is associated with a significant stock price reaction.  Consequently, to save space, 
Table 6 only reports results for this event.   
 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
 
The results reported in Table 6 document that the sample-wide mean abnormal return to 
event 8 is -0.7% with an F-statistic of 6.80 (p-value = 0.0001).  The rejection of H0 suggests 
a pervasive overall negative reac tion to this event, which is consistent with the finding that 
77% of the sample firms exhibit a negative stock price reaction to this event. One 
interpretation of these results is that, based on the negative corporate governance information 
released with the report, the market was disappointed with the firms' lack of progress in their 
governance practices. Based on personal discussions with Peters Committee staff members, 
this interpretation is consistent with their view that Peters himself, built up market 
expectations about substantive change that was not realized given the data that was released. 
Another interpretation could be that this is just new information to the market. 
 
Given the overall negative impact of event 8, we next address cross-sectional variation in the 
reaction.  Our starting point is voting rights. Shareholders must have them for self-regulation 
to be a viable monitoring mechanism.  Without them, shareholders have no way to 
effectively monitor the behavior of the supervisory board and management, nor can they 
initiate change. To evaluate this hypothesis, we compare the mean abnormal returns 
associated with event 8 for various sub-samples. The sub-samples are firms with and without: 
a structured regime, preference shares, certificates, priority shares, and cross-listings on a UK 
or US exchange.17 The sub-sample results are presented in Table 6 where we report the mean 
abnormal return for each sub-sample along with F-statistics for the null hypothesis that the 
sub-sample mean abnormal return is zero and an F-statistic comparing the mean abnormal 
return of the various sub-samples. 
 
Focusing first on the structured regime, the mean abnormal return for firms with a structured 
regime is -0.9%, compared to -0.6% for firms without and -0.2% for firms with a voluntary 
structured regime.  Only the return of -0.9% for the required structured regime is 
significantly different from zero.  Of note however, is that the return for the required 
structure regime sub-sample is significantly more negative when compared to the no 
structured regime and the voluntary structured regime sub-samples.  This is further evidence 
that the required structure regime has detrimental effects on firm value. 
 
The results for cross-listing reveal that firms that are (are not) cross-listed exhibit a mean 
abnormal return of 0.5% (-1.0%).  The -1.0% return for the non-cross-listed firms is 
significantly different from zero and significantly less than the 0.5% return for the cross-
listed sub-sample. This provides evidence that the monitoring effect of cross-listing has a 
beneficial effect on firm value. 
                                                               
17 Cross-listing on the UK or US stock exchanges does not directly translate into voting rights.  However, there 
is additional disclosure required with the cross-listing and this increases accountability.  Thus, the indirect 
benefits could be better pricing but not necessarily higher firm value. 
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Turning to priority shares, we find that firms with (without) such shares have a mean 
abnormal return of -0.3% (-1.0%).  Firms without priority shares experienced a more 
significant ne gative stock price reaction than firms with priority shares. The results for the 
remaining two constraints on voting rights are not as sharp.  In particular, the mean abnormal 
return for firms with (without) certificates is  -0.9% (-0.6%), but they are not significantly 
different from one another.  Similar results are observed for firms with and without 
preference shares.   
 
On balance, the market’s reaction to the release of the monitoring report (event 8) is one of 
disappointment about substantive change through self-regulation.  Furthermore, the market 
appears to differentiate its reaction across firms in a manner dependent upon the firm’s 
existing organizational structure and exchange listing, the presence of the legally required 
structure regime and cross-listing of the firms shares. Our results for certificates, priority and 
preference shares are not definitive. The other ten events, which generated no significant 
investor reaction, dealt mainly with the other activities of the Peters’ Committee including 
the release of its recommendations, private and government proposals on proxy voting, and 
the Minister of Finance’s reply to the monitoring report. Overall, the market is skeptical 
about the substantive evolution of corporate governance practices in the Netherlands through 
self-regulation. 
 
 
6. Conclusions      
 
The purpose of this paper is to gather evidence on the ability of market forces to promote 
investor interests via self-regulation. It is of interest to determine when market forces are 
sufficient to monitor the managers of capital vis-à-vis when additional legal/political actions 
are required to write and enforce contracts between these managers and owners of the capital.   
 
The Netherlands provides an ideal setting to investigate the role of self-regulation. For self-
regulation to have a chance to succeed, shareholders must have voting rights.  Under the 
“pure” form of the structured regime, shareholders in the Netherlands lose their ability to 
directly monitor the supervisory and management boards.  However, the market for corporate 
control still functions since shareholders vote on mergers and acquisitions.  With shareholder 
voting rights restricted permanently or via takeover defenses, shareholders lose their ability 
to initiate change through the market for corporate control as well as through conventional 
monitoring mechanisms.  These points provide the basis for our findings associated with the 
Peters Committee and the market’s skepticism about the evolution of corporate governance.  
These points also cast doubt on the Dutch corporate governance model as a prototype to be 
emulated by others. 
 
It is often argued that the market provides management with the incentives to change because 
of the penalty it assesses firms with poor governance and hence performance.  However, 
some preliminary analysis (not tabled), comparing annual (market adjusted) returns, suggests 
that the sub-sample of structured regime firms under performs the sub-sample of voluntarily 
retained and non-structured regime firms by 5.5% annually. This argument is predicated on 
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the assumption that there are mechanisms in place that can facilitate change.  With the 
supervisory and management boards already controlling the voting rights, it is doubtful that 
this change will take place without legal/political action to restore voting rights to 
shareholders. It is equally doubtful whether the prospects for change are any different for 
existing firms in the long run without voting rights for shareholders (one of the major 
recommendations of the Peters Committee).  A possible except is the disciplining role of the  
market for new listings; here, there are relatively fewer entrenched parties who control voting 
rights. 
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Appendix A 
 
Key events related to Dutch corporate governance practices  
 
The data sources are Het Financieele Dagblad, the preliminary and final report of the Peters Committee, and the 
monitoring report that assessed the impact of the final report of the Peters Co mmittee (one-year after its 
release).   
 
Event 1:   On February 13, 1996 Van Ittersum, chairman of the Amsterdam Stock Exchanges, announces a 
committee for code of best practice.   
 
Event 2:  On February 28, 1996 the Ministries of Finance, Law and Economic Affairs and VvdE (shareholders) 
and VEUO (exchange-listed firms) agree on an arrangement over takeover defenses. 
 
Event 3:  On March 15, 1996 there is an announcement of the members of Committee Corporate Governance.   
Given Dutch consensus approach, all the parties are represented on committee. 
 
Event 4: On October 28, 1996, the publication of the preliminary conclusions of the Peters Committee took 
place.   
 
Event 5:  On June 25, 1997, the publication of the final conclusions of the Peters Committee took place. 
Conclusions are similar to the preliminary report.   
 
Event 6:  On April 18, 1998, an announcement of a Communication channel for shareholders. A small group of 
firms form a private sector initiate or experiment in “voting by proxy” using a system designed and owned by 
the participating firms.   
 
Event 7:  On May 19, 1998, announcement of participating firms in the Communication channel for 
shareholders.   
 
Event 8:  On December 3, 1998 the Peters Committee monitoring report is presented and published.  This is the 
major event as it contains all the corporate governance information that was collected by the monitoring 
committee on the companies.  Jaap Peters presented the report to the Minister of Finance.  During this meeting 
the Minister of Finance announces that legislation on proxy voting will be proposed to the cabinet of ministers.  
The proposed legislation is independent of the private sector initiative.  
 
Event 9   On April 29, 1999, the proposal to introduce proxy voting is approved by ‘Minis terraad’, which means 
it is approved by the “cabinet” of ministers and will be sent to parliament for consideration.   
 
Event 10:  On May 10, 1999 Minister of Finance replies to Peters in a ‘nota’ to the ‘Tweede Kamer’ 
(parliament): firms should provide mo re information on compensation and stock transaction by managers; 
proxy voting should be possible and limitations on voting power should be banned.  However, no specific 
proposals are mentioned and the article described the reply as a ‘wensenlijstje’ (list of wishes).   
 
Event 11: On June 23, 1999, a new European Union Directive is released which states that majority 
shareholders have to make a bid on the remaining shares of the company.  Certificates and preference shares are 
allowed in a firm’s capital structure.   
Table 1a 
 
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics for a sample of 140 Dutch firms over the 1992 to 1999 period. 
(Total sample size is 1,035 observations, 806 observations for bank debt.) 
 
Variable Description Variable Name  Mean Minimum Maximum Std.Dev. 
Tobin’s Q Market value of total assets/replacement value of total assets  TQ 1.576  0.524  23.323   1.472 
Total assets  Book value of total assets in 1,000,000 NLG BVTA        3133.          3.79 109863.    9961. 
Growth Three-year historical growth of total assets  GROWTH 0.428 -0.760   9.810   0.930 
Leverage Long-term debt/book value of total assets  LEV 0.136  0   0.660   0.123 
Listing abroad Dummy variable with value of 1 for listing on a stock 
exchange in the UK and/or US, 0 otherwise 
XLIST 0.160  0   1   0.360 
Structured regime  Dummy variable with value of 1 for presence of legally 
required structural regime, 0 otherwise 
SR 0.473  0   1   0.500 
Voluntary structured regime Dummy variable with value of 1 for presence of voluntarily 
retained structural regime, 0 otherwise 
SR_V 0.132  0   1   0.339 
Priority shares Dummy variable with value of 1 for presence of priority 
shares, 0 otherwise 
PRIO 0.390  0   1   0.490 
Preference shares  Dummy variable with value of 1 for presence of preference 
share option, 0 otherwise 
PREF 0.604  0   1   0.489 
Certificates  Dummy variable with value of 1 for presence of certificates, 
0 otherwise 
CERT 0.370  0   1   0.480 
Interlocks with banks The number of interlocking directorates with banks BANK_ILOCK 0.780  0   8   1.160 
Interlocks with financials  The number of interlocks with financial institutions FIN_ILOCK 1.080  1   9   1.560 
Largest blockholder The stake of the largest blockholder OSIDE_EQ    22.10  0.0 94.00 19.35 
Financial institution blockholdings The stake of block-holdings by banks, insurance companies, 
pension funds and institutionalized venture capitalists 
INSTI_EQ    12.68  0.0 90.73 14.95 
Bank blockholdings The stake of block-holdings by banks  BANK_EQ     7.66  0.0 67.35 10.41 
Industrial blockholdings The stake of industrial blockholders INDUS_EQ   10.22  0.0 93.17 20.32 
Insider blockholdings The stake of supervisory and management board 
blockholdings 
INSIDE_EQ    6.16  0.0 97.05 17.15 
Bank debt Long-term bank debt/book value of total assets  BANK_D     0.072  0.0   0.44   0.089 
 
Table 1b 
 
Select descriptive statistics for sub-samples with no structured regime, a legally required structured regime and a voluntarily 
retained structured regime.  
 
 No Structured Regime 
N=408 
Legally Required Structured Regime 
N=490 
Voluntarily Retained Structured Regime 
N=137 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Mean Minimum Maximum Mean Minimum Maximum 
Tobin’s Q 1.890 0.550 23.323 1.290 0.524 9.516 1.660 0.848 6.347 
Total assets  5200 3.790 109863 1275 33 19205 3627 9 31481 
Growth 0.490 -0.760 9.810 0.329 -0.630 8.510 0.596 -0.410 9.090 
Leverage 0.111 0 0.460 0.144 0 0.660 0.180 0 0.530 
Listing abroad 0.190 0 1 0.100 0 1 0.250 0 1 
Priority shares 0.48 0 1 0.35 0 1 0.25 0 1 
Preference shares  0.42 0 1 0.75 0 1 0.61 0 1 
Certificates  0.28 0 1 0.48 0 1 0.26 0 1 
Interlocks with banks 0.52 0 5 0.87 0 8 1.24 0 5 
Interlocks with financials  0.80 0 8 1.14 0 9 1.69 0 7 
Largest blockholder 25.33 0 94.00 20.36 0 82.62 18.71 0 67.35 
Financial institution 
blockholdin gs 
7.99 0 90.73 16.81 0 90.73 11.84 0 73.17 
Bank blockholdings 5.43 0 58.28 9.26 0 49.99 8.61 0 67.35 
Industrial blockholdings 11.56 0 93.17 9.89 0 93.17 7.41 0 62.00 
Insider blockholdings 11.08 0 97.05 3.11 0 68.30 2.41 0 46.93 
Bank debt 0.054 0 0.380 0.079 0 0.440 0.102 0 0.340 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Results of firm fixed-effects regressions focusing on shareholder rights variables.  The sample consists of 1035 observations 
for 140 firms over  the 1992 to 1999 period. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q (TQ) and all other variable definitions appear 
in Table 1a.  The regressions contain year dummies that are shown and firm dummies that are not shown.  t-values are in 
parentheses and significant coefficients are indicated by * (10% level), ** (5% level), and *** (1% level) based on a one-tailed 
test. 
 
 
 Predicted Sign Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Constant  0.937 (  5.28)*** 1.145 (  5.61)*** 1.861 (  4.45)*** 
Y93  0.281 (  2.95)*** 0.300 (  3.12)*** 0.306 (  3.12)*** 
Y94  0.339 (  3.64)*** 0.391 (  3.99)*** 0.399 (  4.02)*** 
Y95  0.295 (  3.17)*** 0.348 (  3.63)*** 0.332 (  3.43)*** 
Y96  0.406 (  3.42)*** 0.477 (  4.14)*** 0.424 (  3.66)*** 
Y97  0.504 (  3.74)*** 0.600 (  4.43)*** 0.539 (  3.95)*** 
Y98  0.389 (  2.94)*** 0.487 (  3.94)*** 0.415 (  3.14)*** 
Y99  0.431 (  2.38)*** 0.535 (  2.76)*** 0.456 (  2.48)*** 
BVTA - -0.001 ( -3.42)*** -0.001 ( -3.45)*** -0.001 ( -3.45)*** 
LOG(1+GROWTH) + 2.257 (  3.88)*** 2.116 (  3.96)*** 2.019 (  4.11)*** 
LEV +  0.130  (  0.15)   0.474  (  0.59)  0.667  (  0.40) 
XLIST + 2.362 (  4.12)*** 2.391 (  4.19)*** 2.261 (  4.41)*** 
SR -   -0.546 ( -2.37)*** -0.555 ( -2.52)*** 
SR_V -   -0.682 ( -2.43)*** -0.639 ( -2.41)*** 
PRIO -     -0.667 ( -2.61)*** 
PREF -     -0.357  ( -1.97)** 
CERT -     -0.365 ( -1.61)** 
N 
Adj. R2 
 
 
1035 
0.408 
1035 
0.418 
1035 
0.433 
 
Table 3 
 
Results of fixed-effects regressions focusing on ownership structure and financial institution variables.  The sample 
consists of 1035 observations for 140 firms over the 1992 to 1999 period.    The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q (TQ) 
and all other variable definitions appear in Table 1a. The regressions contain year dummies that are shown and firm 
dummies that are not shown. t-values are in parentheses and significant coefficients are indicated by * (10% level), ** 
(5% level), and *** (1% level) based on a one-tailed test. 
 
 Predicted Sign Model (1) Model (2) 
Constant  1.401 (  5.77)*** 1.447 ( 5.72)*** 
Y93  0.310 (  3.21)*** 0.312 ( 3.22)*** 
Y94  0.384 (  4.02)*** 0.388 ( 4.02)*** 
Y95  0.350 (  3.69)*** 0.355 ( 3.70)*** 
Y96  0.501 (  4.65)*** 0.493 ( 4.61)*** 
Y97  0.632 (  4.83)*** 0.618 ( 4.78)*** 
Y98  0.505 (  4.07)*** 0.498 ( 3.99)*** 
Y99  0.566 (  2.84)*** 0.557 ( 2.83)*** 
BVTA - -0.001 ( -3.80)*** -0.001 (-3.89)*** 
LOG(1+GROWTH) + 1.849 (  4.22)*** 1.850 ( 4.25)*** 
LEV +  0.261   (  0.35) 0.343  ( 0.46) 
XLIST + 2.418 (  4.75)*** 2.469 ( 4.70)*** 
SR - -0.568 ( -2.67)*** -0.514 (-2.65)*** 
SR_V - -0.825 ( -2.67)*** -0.754 (-2.66)*** 
OSIDE_EQ + -0.005  ( -1.35)* -0.006  ( 1.47)* 
INDUS_EQ +\- -0.009  ( -1.71)** -0.008  (-1.73)** 
INSIDE_EQ + 0.028  (  1.92)** 0.028  ( 1.90)** 
INSTI_EQ +\- -0.019 ( -3.87)*** -0.019 (-3.87)*** 
FIN_ILOCK +   -0.081  (-1.53)* 
N 
Adj. R2 
 1035 
0.463 
1035 
0.465 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
 
t-tests comparing the means of the corporate governance variables in the pre-Peters Committee (1992-1996) period to 
those in the post-Peters Committee period (1997-1999). The sample consists of 1035 observations, 639 for the pre-Peters 
period and 396 observations for the post-Peters period.  Significant differences in the means are indicated by * (10% 
level), ** (5% level), and *** (1% level) based on a two-tailed test. 
 
 
 
 Corporate Governance Variables 
Means 
Variable 1992-1996 1997-1999 Sign Level 
Tobin’s Q 1.395 1.868 *** 
Total assets  2705 3824 * 
Growth 0.262 0.695 *** 
Leverage 0.140 0.129  
Listing abroad 0.13 0.19 ** 
Structured Regime-
required 
0.48 0.47  
Structured Regime- 
voluntarily retained 
0.11 
 
0.16 
 
** 
Priority shares  0.41 0.34 ** 
Preference shares 0.62 0.58  
Certificates 0.39 0.35  
Interlocks with banks 0.82 0.72  
Interlocks with financials 1.08 1.07  
Largest blockholder 23.17 20.38 ** 
Financial institution 
blockholdings 
12.56 12.86  
Bank blockholdings 7.38 8.13  
Industrial blockholdings 10.91 9.11  
Insider blockholdings 6.59 5.47  
Bank debt 0.071 0.073  
 
 
Table 5 
 
Results of fixed-effects regression for governance variables for 1992-1999, 1992 -1996 and 1997-1999. The sample consists of 1035 
observations for 140 firms over the 1992 to 1999 period. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q (TQ) and all other variable definitions 
appear in Table 1a.  The regressions contain year dummies that are shown and firm dummies that are not shown. t-values are in 
parentheses and significant coefficients are indicated by * (10% level), ** (5% level), and *** (1% level) based on a one-tailed test. 
 
 
Results for 1992-1999 Results for 1992-1996 vs. 1997-1999:   
 
Predicted Sign 
 1992-1996 1997-1999 
Constant   2.117 ( 4.99)*** 1.853 ( 4.56)***   
Y93  0.319 ( 3.30)*** 0.308 ( 3.37)***   
Y94  0.396 ( 4.11)***   0.363 ( 4.00)***   
Y95  0.341 ( 3.55)***  0.317 ( 3.59)***   
Y96  0.444 ( 4.20)*** 0.456 ( 5.07)***   
Y97  0.556 (4.32)***   1.199 ( 3.74)*** 
Y98  0.427 (3.32)***   1.080 ( 3.25)*** 
Y99  0.483  ( 2.56)***   1.138 ( 2.68)*** 
BVTA  -0.001 (-3.85)*** -0.001 (-4.26)*** 0.001 ( 0.73) 
LOG(1+GROWTH) + 1.788  ( 4.29)***          1.578 ( 2.88)*** 0.357 ( 0.39) 
LEV +  0.496  ( 0.67) -0.552 (-0.82) -0.771 (-0.85) 
XLIST + 2.348 ( 4.92)*** 2.161 ( 5.25)*** 0.272 ( 0.56) 
SR - -0.542  (-2.86)*** -0.356 (-2.03)** -0.613 (-3.11)*** 
SR_V - -0.692  (-2.66)*** -0.523 (-2.18)** -0.196 (-0.78) 
CERT - -0.236  (-1.30)* -0.030 ( -0.16) -0.283 (-2.06)** 
PRIO - -0.669  (-2.91)*** -0.722 (-3.18)*** 0.031 ( 0.19) 
PREF - -0.316  (-1.94)** -0.232 (-1.51)*  -0.115 (-0.67) 
OSIDE_EQ + -0.007  (-1.66)** -0.004 (-0.81) -0.007 (-1.40)* 
INDUS_EQ -/+ -0.008  (-1.51)* -0.013 (-2.45)*** 0.007 ( 1.38)* 
INSTI_EQ -/+ -0.020  (-3.92)*** -0.019 (-3.78)*** 0.002 (-0.48) 
INSIDE_EQ + -0.026  (-1.88)**   -0.024 (-2.05)** 0.004 (-0.61) 
FIN_ILOCK + -0.081  (-1.55)* -0.020 (-0.40) -0.137 (-2.21)** 
N 
Adj. R2 
 1035 
0.478 
1035 
0.497 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
 
Event study results for event 8 (the release of the Peter’s Committee monitoring report). Of the eleven events 
listed in Appendix A, only event 8 is associated with a significant mean stock price reaction.  The table reports 
mean abnormal returns for the full sample and various sub-samples as well as the F-statistic for those mean 
abnormal returns.  F-statistics comparing the mean abnormal return of various sub-samples are also provided. 
Results are for a sample of 114 firms with complete security return data available over the January 1, 1996 to 
December 31, 1999 period.  Estimation is based on the Seemingly-Unrelated-Regression (SUR) method 
described in Schipper and Thompson (1983 and 1985). Significance levels are indicated by *(10% level), 
**(5% level), and ***(1% level). 
 
  
 
 
Sample  
  
 
Mean Abnormal Return  
for the full sample and 
select sub-samples. 
 
 
F-statistic: 
(Mean abn ormal  
 return equals zero) 
 
F-statistic:  
(Sub-sample mean 
abnormal returns are 
equal) 
 
   Full Sample (N=114)                        
 
-0.7% 
 
6.80*** 
 
 
 
Sub-Samples:                                  
 
   Structured Regime   
         Required (N=64)        
   No Structured Regime (N=28)       
 
-0.9% 
-0.6% 
 
8.08*** 
                  1.71 
 
4.41** 
 
   Structured Regime 
         Voluntary   (N=16)        
   No Structured Regime (N=28)       
 
-0.2% 
-0.6% 
 
                  1.42 
                  1.71 
 
                1.05 
 
   Structured Regime   
         Required (N=64)        
   Structured Regime  
         Voluntary (N=16)       
 
-0.9% 
-0.2% 
 
8.08*** 
                  1.42 
 
   8.59*** 
 
   Certificates       (N=46)     
   No Certificates  (N=68)                                          
 
-0.9% 
-0.6% 
 
8.89*** 
                  3.34* 
 
0.01 
 
   Preference Shares       (N=63)   
   No Preference Shares (N=51)                             
 
-0.7% 
-0.8% 
 
                  4.18** 
6.15*** 
 
0.02 
 
   Priority Shares        (N=42)  
   No Priority Shares  (N=72)                                            
 
-0.3% 
-1.0% 
 
                   0.65 
11.20*** 
 
    8.94***  
 
   Cross-listed UK/US  (N=18)                   
   Not Cross-listed       (N=96)           
 
0.5% 
-1.0% 
 
                   0.90 
10.11*** 
 
   12.71***  
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